CFP: HUMANA.MENTE Journal of Philosophical Studies: Empirical Sciences
HUMANA.MENTE Journal of Philosophical Studies
Call for Papers Issue 32, April 2017
Beyond Toleration? Inconsistency and Pluralism in the Empirical Sciences
Luis Estrada-González (Institute for Philosophical Research, National Autonomous University of Mexico)
María del Rosario Martínez-Ordaz (Institute for Philosophical Research, National Autonomous University of Mexico)
Nowadays it is recognized that, at least for methodological purposes, entertaining pluralism in the study of science can offer a great number of benefits. One of them would be the opportunity of analyzing the role that some epistemic virtues – such as scope, fruitfulness, consistency, and simplicity, to name just a few – play in scientific activity. From the different pluralist positions, a lot has been said about empirical adequacy, refutability and explanatory power, yet consistency has not been equally dealt with.
As a matter of fact, the lack of consistency and its philosophical implications have been studied from an angle that does not necessarily involve a pluralism of any kind. At the moment, it is commonly accepted that inconsistencies can be more frequent in scientific development than the traditional philosophy of science could have expected, and the idea that inconsistency is not always a synonym of logical anarchy, as it was suggested in the classical literature of logic and the philosophy of science, has been gaining support. All this has been possible mostly thanks to the emergence of paraconsistent logics and the availability of case studies that show how inconsistency is not an uncommon phenomenon in science.
But pluralism does not necessarily entail inconsistency toleration nor vice versa. Accordingly, the main motivation for this volume is to explore the links between pluralism and inconsistency toleration in science, in order to connect the reflections on inconsistency toleration with broader and major issues in philosophy of science. In order to do so, we will suggest two different lines of investigation: First, to focus on the implications of some pluralistic accounts in the philosophy of science for the study of inconsistency; second, to analyze the implications of some paraconsistent approaches regarding pluralism in science.Some questions to be addressed in this issue of Humana.Mente are:
- Is there any connection between pluralism and inconsistency toleration? Does a specific type of pluralism entail specific type of inconsistency toleration commitments?
- Do particular inconsistency toleration commitments entail a particular kind of scientific pluralism?
- Is it possible to distinguish between different types of inconsistency toleration commitments?
- Which inconsistent but non-trivial scientific theories are well understood by which types of paraconsistent approaches?
Topics of the proposals might include, but need not to be restricted to:
- Formal tools for the representation of inconsistency toleration in empirical sciences
- Different types of inconsistency toleration commitments
- Integrated history and philosophy of science and new historical cases of inconsistent science
- Inconsistency toleration theses and causality in science
- Inconsistent methodologies, methodologies for inconsistency and scientific pluralism
- Particular types of scientific pluralism and particular types of inconsistency toleration commitments
- Inconsistent science and varieties of scientific (anti-)realism
Invited authors who have already agreed to participate:
Diderik Batens (Universiteit Ghent, Belgium)
Otávio Bueno (University of Miami, USA)
Bryson Brown (University of Lethbridge, Canada)
Joke Meheus (Universiteit Ghent, Belgium)
Federica Russo (Universiteit van Amsterdam, The Netherlands)
Dunja Šešelja (Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Germany)
Articles should be max. 45.000 characters long (including spaces, references and an abstract of no more than 200 words). Articles must be submitted in blind review format (in .PDF preferably). Please omit any self-identifying information within the abstract and body of the paper. Submissions should be sent via email to: InconsistentScienceUNAM@gmail.com
Deadline for submissions: December 10th 2016
Notification of acceptance: February 28th 2017
Publication of special issue: April 2017