No Fly Zones are Only a Precursor to the Real Deal: Universal Safe Zones

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Universal Safe Zones Need Nations to be Interlocutor and Supporters. The Framework for Universal Safe Zones:

Universal Safe Zone Memorandum of Understanding as the Enabling Instrument

It is time, long overdue, for the outside players to vigorously support the securing and establishment of Universal Safe Zones under a published protocol that ensures expedited relief to a self-designated declared USZ geographical area. Humanitarian assistance should be forthcoming to any area that can keep the peace and security integrity of the USZ. Whether this extends to military supplies and matériel will depend on what armed unit is providing for defense and ensuring public safety. Establishing Universal Safe Zones can be the integrative, incremental means of bringing this conflict to a close. Personal safety is a concern that resonates with ALL Syrians. The first step is cognition. Yes, the straw man issues diplomats have fretted over is in fact a construct presented by Sergei Lavrov. The deconstructing ground truth over the past three years has progressed in spite of diplomats’ public displays of denial; it’s time to move on. The solution to this impediment to peace is to brush past a dysfunctional, self-imposed construct that conflicts with reality on the ground throughout the country. While issues of national sovereignty ought not simply be brushed off, this is an opportunity to raise the issue of what sovereignty really is at the beginning of the 21st Century and the future raison of diplomatic approaches to sintering a deconstructed nation state.

The regime and its Jihadist/Islamist opponents will not be able to ethically compete with moderates or anonymous independent Alawites if the national focus evolves to protecting citizens from ALL combatants waging war on civilians. Druze communities will observe intently. By encouraging all Syrians, including embattled Alawites and fearful Druze to seek the establishment of USZs; Public Safety becomes the domain of ALL Syrians, not just the moderate fighters subject to civilian authority. Alawite villages then would have the opportunity to consider seeking support and declaring themselves USZs as long as they ascribe to and demonstrate Universal Protection of ALL citizens and residents of Syria.

After the establishment of the first Universal Safe Zones, a model will exist on the ground that Alawite, Druze, Christian, and other minorities can declare belief in. The intent actually is to provide a means for non-Sunni Syrians to participate in creating Universal Safe Zones by adopting a non-sectarian non-government model for restoring public safety and rule of law. If Alawite areas begin to declare Universal Safe Zones and other USZs immediately recognize and welcome them, the process has a chance of changing the war’s denouement to one that does not lead to a Lebanonization of Syria. This involves creating Universal Safe Zones under civil supervision with military units in the area willing to secure USZs based upon the USZ (with Transitional Justice) Agreement as signatories.

They will need effective and secure communications to accomplish this. A robust network also makes PKO more effective by enabling close coordination with Civil, Protection units, and NGO counterparts. As USZs are set up, this template agreement could help with establishing more safe zones. It is an imperative to continually encourage Alawites, Druze, Palestinians, Christians, Turkmen, Kurds, and others to negotiate a USZ Agreement and declare their town a Universal Safe Zones. Minorities may need tangible encouragement to enable the confidence to step away from the Assad regime by subscribing to a USZ Agreement.

The beginning after initiating a true national dialog is crafting a Universal Safe Zone Memorandum of Understanding and its Supporting Service Level Sub-Agreement Contracts to facilitate the establishment of Universal Safe Zone areas within Syria. This is the precursor to making Universal Safe Zones real on the ground. To effect the above, this also requires outside nations’ commitment to the Public Safety of ALL Syrians via USZs, and not merely a focus on supplying weapons, sovereignty issues or a successor government at the expense of Syrians in the here and now. Further, the establishment of Universal Safe Zones that apply to and protect ALL Syrians under a Transitional Rule of Law or its equivalent is an essential dynamic that depends on the influence and actionables only capable by outside powers. The intent of provider parties presenting a USZ Memorandum of Understanding draft to interested Syrians is as an opening move in creating Universal Safety Zones under civil supervision with military units in the area willing to secure USZs based upon the USZ MoU as SLA contract signatories subservient to the MoU signing civil authority.

The USZ MoU is, for all legal and diplomatic considerations, not a national political agreement, and if anything is in wording overtly supportive of the current government’s agenda through the geographical area in question by seeking support to effect the rights and prerogatives of the 2012 Syria Constitution. The question of national sovereignty is not raised, as the above law of the land is embedded, and the MoU’s intent is explicit, to effect the National Constitution until such time that the national government can use it’s prerogatives to effect such under rule of law. At the same time, opportunities to ameliorate or to even cease what is being inflicted upon Syria’s Civilians will be manifest in securing such a MoU for an area. Colleague David Falt is succinct in writing,

“Operating in an international legal gray zone will require tremendous investments of political and diplomatic capital, especially with respect to allies reluctant to act without clear legal authority. But the potential payoff can be high not only in terms of immediate humanitarian imperatives but also in shaping the future legal environment in ways more responsive to such needs. As the Kosovo crisis shows, operating this way in cases of urgent humanitarian necessity inevitably shapes the future normative terrain, especially as international bodies react ex post facto and the precedent value of actions is debated. For the United States, this means it must conduct its diplomacy and justify publicly its actions in ways to promote long-term a more protective regime. Meanwhile, those states skeptical of or hostile to a more human rights– protective regime must come to see it as in their own long-term interests to facilitate rather than undermine timely and decisive action.”

Another excerpt is taken as illustrative, this time from Mark Shaw’s paper on Interim Justice,

“The failure to use interim justice and security arrangements in a number of other transitions to democracy has been detrimental to the overall outcome. This is particularly the case in which the interim justice and security measures include community inputs. Nevertheless, nearly all transitions make use of some mechanism for interim justice and security, although there has not been enough work on determining what approaches have and have not been effective.”

With the restoration of Public Safety, the absence of any functional Rule of Law will have both an immediate and downstream affect on Syria and the country’s future prospects.

The local jurisdiction and signatory pro tempore will either be an existing civil authority, however it may have come to be or an existing local government body. Druze and Alawite communities may fall under this latter characterization. All local military and intelligence units agreeing to support the civil authority in its quest to establish universal public safety and rule of law will be signatories to Service-Level Sub-Agreements to the effected Universal Safe Zone Memorandum of Understanding. The MoU wording indicates their subservience to local civil authority, and thus not a direct confrontation of nation sovereignty, but of being subservient to USZ civil authority and tasked to local public safety and rule of law under the Syrian Constitution, unlike the Damascus government.

The Structure and Functioning of the USZ MoU Template is designed for flexibility in terms of the Sub-Agreements, the Parties as Service Providers and or Service beneficiaries and recipients, and the particulars of a given USZ and how it s need will change over time (sometimes, overnight).

The Supporting Service Level Sub-Agreement Contracts

A Universal Safe Zone Memorandum of Understanding’s Service-Level Sub-Agreements by Performing Parties (SLA) is the service contract where a service is formally defined. The Universal Safe Zone SLA is an agreement buttressing at the operational level the Universal Safe Zone, covering the humanitarian and disaster related services that are needed. For example, an SLA between an IT supplier and the ULSZ’s communications manager (who may actually still communicate with the regime’s ministry) would lay out the working relationship and expectations of parties to this sub-agreement.

In practice, the term SLA is sometimes used to refer to the contracted delivery time (of the service or performance). As an example, Internet service providers will commonly include service level agreements within the terms of their contracts with customers to define the level(s) of service being sold in plain language terms. In this case the SLA will typically have a technical definition in terms of mean time between failures (MTBF), mean time to repair or mean time to recovery (MTTR); various data rates; throughput; jitter; or similar measurable details. A service-level agreement is a negotiated agreement between two or more parties, where one is the customer and the others are service providers. This can be a legally binding formal or an informal "contract”.

These mutually supporting service-level agreements bringing to focus outside assistance to address military intelligence, matériel, and civil authority needs to specifically and with effect, establish a Universal Lawfare Safe Zone could be the basis of a geographically incremental North and Northeast (beginning in al-Hasakah & Rojava Cantons) to West and Southwest approach to restoring public safety in Syria, the minimum threshold for sovereignty

Banks participating under the currency compensation (not the exchange of) scheme of the such as NGOs operating in or with compensating local hires with both marked, non-Syrian currency and mobile phone banking would also be a provider signatory to a Service Sub-Agreement. This would avoid conflicting with the wording of current regime proscriptions on unauthorized currency trading. Turkish banks have an active online and mobile phone banking service sector.

Contracts between the service provider and other third parties are not part of this exchange, as there can be no "agreement" between third parties; those agreements are simply independent "contracts." Internal groups to support ULSZ MoU SLAs, however, may use operational-level agreements or OLAs.

The SLA records a common understanding about services, priorities, responsibilities, guarantees, and warranties. Each area of service scope should have the "level of service" defined. Service level agreements are, by their nature, "output" based, and NGOs can also specify the way the service is to be delivered, through a service level specification and using subordinate "objectives" other than those related to the level of service.

The USZ MoU SLA may specify the levels of availability, serviceability, performance, operation, or other attributes of the service, such as billing. The "level of service" can also be specified as "expected" and "minimum," which allows customers to be informed what to expect (the minimum), while providing a measurable (average) target value that shows the level of organization performance. In some contracts, penalties may be agreed upon in the case of non-compliance of the SLA (but see "internal" customers below). It is important to note that the "agreement" relates to the services the customer receives, and not how the service provider delivers that service.

SLAs commonly include segments to address: a definition of services, performance measurement, problem management, USLZ duties, warranties, disaster recovery, and conditions for termination of an agreement. In order to ensure that SLAs are consistently met, these agreements are often designed with specific lines of demarcation and the parties involved are required to meet regularly to create an open forum for communication. Certain Security or Human Rights Violation penalties will require prompt enforcement, but most SLAs also leave room for annual revalidation so that it is possible to make changes based on new information.

Each Universal Safe Zone that is negotiated and agreed to by local civil authorities, utilizing a Universal Safe Zone Memorandum of Understanding template and its Supporting Service Level Sub-Agreement Contracts is a potential Island of Peace. In the chaotic reality that is Syria today, achieving bit by bit, such universal sanctuaries are beacons to another city or region, and little by little, the killing is halted. This is not a grand approach to diplomacy. But by their very existence, Universal Safe Zones can bring in a granular fashion, safety to an already shattered nation. Additionally, USZs will by their very nature delineate ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra, et al as less than, and eventually as a ‘foreign’ presence grafted upon Syrian society. Some native fighters may migrate to their home areas that are under the auspices of an established Universal Safe Zone. The Center of Gravity is not relative to capturing territory or killing more opponents. It is and must be the People of Syria if a sustainable denouement of this horror is to end without the laying of dragons’ seed for a future war.

Yes, fighting will continue, irrespective of the establishment of Universal Safe Zones. But when these USZ areas stand up as visible safe havens, the raison de guerre shifts. And as many if not most rebel fighters continue to focus on Assad, taking territory and killing their opponents, the new USZs will beckon with a clarity about Universal Safety to ALL Syrians tired of the losses, the killing, and the pitiless destruction of Syria’s cities and towns. War weariness is now part of the human terrain. This is important.

In Universal Safe Zones fighters will fall under a chain of command that is Civilian Led, and their weapons and supply of matériel will be distributed and controlled by outside advisors who engage with the civil authority and interact with the warfighter under accompanying Supporting Service Level Sub-Agreement Contracts, whose violation brings immediate repercussions, including the cutting of C4ISR products and timely resupply. Changing and guiding the ethos of the warfighter is paramount for the USZ, and into the post-conflict period. The requirements for Doctrine and Training imbedded in the Supporting Service Level Agreements is the vehicle to change the values of personnel who may become cadre for a new Syrian Army in the post-war period. This part of the Service Level Agreements must be homogenous across ALL USZs and their underlying MoUs and SLAs. It is an imperative. From many units, one unitary force with a common ethos of what is a Syrian Soldier, and what does he stand for in service is an imperative. It is critical for the post-war reconstruction-rehabilitation of any successor Syrian military.

The crafting of templates for a Universal Safe Zone Memorandum of Understanding and Supporting Service Level Sub-Agreement Contracts should be assigned to a core of experts including Syrians who are lawyers, HA-DR experts from both UN agencies and involved NGOs, diplomats, and military advisors steeped in Peace Keeping and Stabilization Operations, and yes, the military advisors who will look to enabling Service Level Sub-Agreement Contracts setting the standards for the units and fighters who agree to being in a chain of command that begins with the civil authority that is the signatory to the USZ MoU for the area. This aspect, not coincidentally, is the kernel from which a successor command structure for a military force in a post-conflict Syria may emerge, with doctrine and training common to ALL, repeat, ALL established Universal Safe Zone areas and regions. The supporting ethos will be forged on the ground as these protective forces embrace a new mission focus.

While the term secrecy may be too stark a characterization, the above is NOT the venue for creating buy-in from parties who will be haggling over every detail. That will come later. What the above is for is the crafting of a solution where none currently exists. Privacy and confidentiality should be prized sat this juncture for the freedom and flexibility of thought far from the inevitable cacophony that will follow. In addition, The Syrian regime and its allies should be kept unaware for as long as practically possible. There will be attempts to criticize, denigrate, and sabotage this initiative as soon as it is made known to the regime, Russia, Iran, and China. Even Turkey will have motives to derail this initiative.

Basic Steps in Standing up Al Hasakah USZ

• In assisting the USZ civil and protective force on expansion, conduct a quiet aerial surveillance as well as a commo traffic survey of the village/area in question to ascertain status prior to making contact in the most positive manner possible. This may vary according to locale.

• A letter of offer and acceptance, e.g., a LOA perhaps should be the first step in addressing the issue of weapons and matériel transfers with the designated protective force(s). Actually, pressing as an operational issue will be the vetting of personnel and the subsequent provision of intelligence product and communications gear to interface in a net-centric manner. The counter-intelligence function related to this will also be critical to ensuring trust of the USZ authorities.

• Arrange for direct communication-negotiation and agree to first send in a stabilization team to ‘protect’ the inhabitants in an area to be incorporated if so desired. Engaging existing armed inhabitants is key.

• Provisions must be made to begin the registration of vehicles with new plates matched up with ID of the vehicle and ownership as a first step in controlling and preventing terrorists from entering the USZ with the intent to do harm. Locally flown small ISR drones tied into the C4ISR net for the USZ should support this. This can be accomplished with registration centers as well as at roadblocks with digital equipment that is integrated with the C4ISR databases on secure servers.

• Arrange for impartial, non-corrupt civil policing as a precursor to signing any USZ MoU. CBMs, or confidence building measures will likely be the coin of the realm for the foreseeable future. Some reports about the PYD’s Rojava ‘civil police force’ are troubling. A lack of training and understanding of rule of law has also been noted. This has to be dealt with in the MoU, and not in a Service Sub-Level Agreement contract.

• The nature of Rule of Law must be addressed at the MoU level. “It has been rightly noted that all politics are local. The same can be said of transitional justice. If transitional justice proposals are to have a chance at contributing to sustainable peace in Syria, there must be no victor’s justice”

- David Tolbert, president of the International Center for Transitional Justice

• By designating outside observers/private military contractors with the authority to bear arms and use in defense of the people within the designated USZ, a purview granted by the local civilian authority, a fundamental shift in the conflict would have a greater chance to initiate a relaxation of tensions, a precursor to trust. To some extent, these personnel are there as trainers and to set an example of what should be expected. The National Syrian to Syrian Dialog should be allowed to observe and report their findings to all Syrians, including the failures and how these incidents are dealt with.

• These defensive-protective teams must have direct commo with the local military commander & staff as well as the germane USZ provisional civil authorities and an express ROE allowing for protection of their charges. Everyone must be in the loop, 24/7. This allows not only for superior situational awareness, but swift accountability for the force’s infractions.

• Occupying this vacant position will prove difficult for the ruling clique and their security forces and popular committees to outflank, especially if a growing constellation of USZ inkspots improve their own internal LOCs and the normal traffic of commerce and employment slowly returns to a remunerable existence.

• There has to be in place a format & funds to immediately employ unneeded fighters in a USZ, paid with a stable currency. Demobilization is a critical aspect of stabilizing the USZ. Provisions for mobile banking should be part of this protocol, including the payment of goods and services from vendors to the USZ civil administration and other contractors in non-Syrian pounds. Black markets will arise, but should not be encouraged.

• An internal dynamic of the USZ will be kick-starting the return to a new ‘normal’ wherein granular components of a new nation-state are restoring public safety and order while introducing rule of law, beginning with International Humanitarian Law as a working template.

• In many ways, the real delicate task in a Universal Safe Zone is in its immediate, local post-conflict period. This is where the seeds of renewed conflict or of a new Syria are planted and germinated. The training and indoctrination of a common USZ doctrine with fighters who are signatories to Sub-MoU Service Level Agreement Contracts is integral to this process. The training and shared doctrine will be the basis for a new Syrian military as the protective forces are drawn down and consolidated with the cessation of hostilities and security is increasingly handed over to civil policing.

• A later stage introduction that would be appreciated by most in a USZ would be UN sponsored travel documents similar to laissez-passer; see 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees as an underlying precedent. The subliminal and functional shifts implied are not insignificant.

• A starting template to begin the process of self-determination and rule of law via representative civil government should be drawn up in advance. People tend to find it easier to criticize and adjust an existing ideation as opposed to starting with a blank sheet.

• UNDP participation along with an armed UN Observer force with a functional ROI that is common to ALL USZs would also serve to stabilize with a civilian face and be conducive to eventual reintegration of USZs into a national structure. The later stage introduction of UN police may be an option to begin planning for.

IGOs and NGOs

“Nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) may be conceived of as the champions of social globalization. Sometimes referred to as the “Fifth Estate in Global Governance,” NGOs have evolved over the past two decades to become widely accepted – and contested as the de facto guardians of the interests of humanity”

If Turkey relents in its embargo of Kurdish Syria and steps back to see the opportunities that would present themselves if it began to integrate its economy with al Hasakah Governorate, the entire region would begin to stabilize while yielding benefits that are also strategic in nature. Qamishli is a potential hub within Syria to begin tying it to both Turkey and KRG-Iraq. Al Hasakah USZ could then employ its road, rail, and air lines of communication to enable NGOs to facilitate the entry of humanitarian aid, and supported by the exhortations of the Syrian people via the National Syrian to Syrian Dialog include the transit of a number of hospital trains to move forward into other parts of Syria. By opening up its borders with Al Hasakah governorate, humanitarian agencies could by using NGOs, push much needed aid forward into Al Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor Governorates as protective forces who are anti-regime/ISIS secure rail LOCs with the assistance of both supplied C4ISR products as well as an organic capability fused into a product at the Al Hasakah USZ administrative level. Pushing humanitarian assistance forward will also serve to reduce tensions between Kurds and Arabs and introduce a sense of interdependency with common goals.

Security for LOCs

Security for the rail lines ideally would be at the first level, a toll free number people are able to call to reach those whose primary mission is protecting LOCs. This dedicated force should have as an organic component, small UAVs for ISR in the buffer zones along these critical LOCs. Because the threat of air strikes by the regime cannot be overlooked, anti-air missile batteries should be supplied and possibly manned by private military contractors. The MIM-23 Hawk air defense missile system is a good candidate, and although it is not new technology, upgraded systems are sufficient, especially if integrated with outside nations C4ISR capabilities that will track potentially hostile aircraft beginning with lift off from air bases in the east. It should be noted that unlike MANPADs these systems would not provide opponents such as radical Islamists and ISIS any benefit if captured. In addition, the initial provision of such air defense can over time be allowed to creep forward into areas that impinge on regime activity.

Development

Kurds and Arab inhabitants of al-Hasakah Governorate have suffered from a lack of economic development in the region. A USZ can be the kick-starter for economic development with investment from Turkey and trade with KRG-Iraq. Establishing Al Hasakah Universal Safe Zone will afford HA/DR NGOs the road, rail, and air links to begin establishing an effective LOC network extending west and south without having to wait for a Chapter 7 UNSC resolution to pass. Routing aid through Damascus is a travesty and a non-IGO mode of transporting aid shipments from Turkey into a sub-national Al Hasakah USZ would not conflict with the Russian imposed blockage at the UNSC. It should be remembered that the governorate has attracted a significant number of IDPs from the rest of Syria. Opening the rail line from Nusaybin, Turkey into Qamishli would also reestablish links to the Iraqi rail system and facilitate Turkish trade with northern Iraq. Nusasybin could become the eastern terminus for UNHCR and WFP shipments with a private concern shuttling forward humanitarian cargo to the new Qamishli rail yard. Turkey’s rail sector produces its own diesel electric locomotives as well as rolling stock and should be encouraged to bid on the equipment needed to facilitate standing up an independent rump operation of Syria’s rail system. The appropriately crafted legal instruments should indicate that at the appropriate time this segment would be merged into the Chemins de Fer Syriens, CFS. Turkey, Syria, and Iraq share standard gauge rail and Nusaybin, Turkey’s new rail yard is a short distance

across the border from Qamishli’s new rail yard that is off of the rail line leading directly to the northern Iraq rail crossing. The restoration of transportation links into Al Hasakah USZ will rewrite the conditions under which a Free Syria must function. It will, in effect, open Al Hasakah to the rest of the world.

Along with the roadways that are currently blocked by Turkey and KRG-Iraq, Qamishli airport can be the initial air terminus for the Universal Safe Zone. This airport is critical to restoring normalcy and commerce to the Jezira. Qamishli has air links into select
Turkish cities, including Antakya, and an air link into Erbil will open up a plethora of connections to the outside world for both commerce as well as travelers engaged in diplomacy, humanitarian assistance, commerce and private travel. This would be the time to move forward at the consular level with the issuing of Laissez-Passer to both control and facilitate Syrian citizens’ travel. A 21st Century Consular Mission within Syria is needed to help restore this sense of normalcy. This broad shift in access will facilitate the restoration of social stability and begin the economic development of al Hasakah Universal Safe Zone, sending a clear message to the rest of an embattled

Syria. Shaping the perspectives and future prospects of Turkey and KRG-Iraq with an Al Hasaka Universal Safe Zone benefits and stabilized the region surrounding the USZ.
Hope is in short supply in this fissured country.

Little noticed in the west is the growing influence in KRG by Iran. In recent years it has reduced military pressure on KRG and although it has an extensive network of agents in KRG, the emphasis has shifted towards economic influence. While trade between KRG and Turkey was $8 billion in 2013, Iran’s trade rose to $4 billion last year compared to $100 million in 2000. Iran continues to increase its influence via investment and trade via initiatives such as the Iranian-Kurdistan Region Economic Forum. Turkey would benefit by supplanting Iranian economic influence across the estranged Kurdistan region with the easing of tensions and increasing investment and trade. A stabilizing Al Hasakah USZ could begin reconstruction and economic development. The governorate was already a neglected region by the Damascus government prior to the conflict, and it is even more pressed due to an influx of refugees fleeing the war in other parts of Syria. The imposed isolation by Turkey and KRG has exacerbated the human suffering.

Redefining the post-war economy from a kleptocracy run by the Makhlouf and Assad clans to a more open economy using commercial banking loan facilities via supporting SLA contracts would avoid having to involve the IMF or other international governmental organizations. Al Hasakah was in need of economic development before the war broke out; this is an opportunity to begin the process before a contiguous peace returns to Syria. Beginning Economic Development and Reconstruction in the Northeast before the war ceases is a means of introducing loan facilities and sets the stage to effectively and deliberately deny the Makhlouf clan from benefiting in Syria’s reconstruction efforts, necessitated by the Assad clan’s war upon Syria. Allowing Rami Makhlouf to benefit from his cousin’s pernicious actions that has destroyed much of Syria’s cities would be unacceptable to most Syrians.

Damascus has reportedly received up to $500 million per month and lines of credit from Tehran to finance food and oil imports. That dependence would undoubtedly grow as the conflict continues. The Central Bank of Syria, reportedly with help from Russia , has also resorted to printing money, spurring monthly inflation rates of close to 35 percent. Because of the rampant inflation and plunging Syrian pound, a new Syrian Law passed in June 2012 punishes the unlicensed practicing of currency exchanging. Law No. 18 for the year 2013 amends Law No. 29 for the year 2012 on the penalties imposed on the persons who practice the currency exchange profession without a license, and those who move or transfer foreign or local currencies between Syria and abroad without a license . Syria’s economy has shrunk by at least 35%; the implied inflation rate is now 91.9% .

Organizations participating in assisting a USZ should be encouraged to hire locally and compensate, as per the Sub- USZ Memorandum of Understanding Service Contract, with either marked, non-Syrian currency or via direct transfer with an approved and participating bank’s mobile banking services. Most Syrians would prefer being paid in a stable, usable currency. The currency protocols for a USZ would be designed to both protect the USZ residents from currency fluctuations and deny non-participants the opportunity to take advantage of what they are neither a signatory to or being a resident of the USZ. This perquisite of a USZ also serves as an inducement to those living in non-USZ areas to consider the establishment of their own USZ.

From a western viewpoint, cutting off the ISIS in Al Raqqa from its LOCs that extend down into Anbar Province in Iraq would be a strategic move that will serve to reduce the footprint of failed state conditions that Islamists seek in exporting jihad to the EU and also the United States. The first USZ’s integrated transportation hub will in turn enable the anti-regime tribes of Deir ez-Zor to receive much needed humanitarian assistance as well as timely military advice, outside C4ISR products as well as the means to develop local products, and war matériel to prosecute vigorously the operations of ISIS as well as the SAA. At some point, the tribes’ current accommodations with al Nusra will deconstruct and further complicate fighting in the governorate. A stable Al Hasakah could be the logistical rear for tribes who see no alternative than making alliances with Jabhat al Nusra in order to fend off ISIS.

An expanding USZ would be strategic in addressing the ISIS stranglehold on Al Raqqa and the M4 – Euphrates Corridor stretching south to Deir ez-Zor City and governorate and on to Abu Kamal on the Iraqi border, thence south to Ramadi and Falluja in Anbar Province. If nothing is done to break this axis, it will prolong conflict in both Syria and Iraq, providing a geographical base of operations for ISIS and its Islamic allies.

Iraqi territory that is downstream on the Euphrates also being at risk makes this an international imperative. If anti-air resources could be applied specifically to this site to protect the infrastructure and the lands downstream to establish an air denial zone, millions of Syrians could benefit. Using older Hawk missile batteries upgraded with Lockheed Martin’s Omnyx Air C3 Infrastructure (or Hawk XXI) and tied into Turkish AD assets may be an effective start to air defense in stabilized areas. While the missile batteries themselves would require expanded ground perimeter defenses, it is arguable that unlike MANPADs, capture will not enable Islamists to use military equipment requiring dedicated training and support. It is also an air defense system that is not man portable.

Fighting in the west is likely to be dominated by a strengthened Assad regime even as increased outside support will keep the corridor from Aleppo down along the M-5 and Orontes River in a state of flux. Although regime forces are pushing hard south of Damascus to secure an enlarged state beyond the confines of Tartus and Latakia governorates on the Mediterranean coast, it is likely that the Islamists and remaining moderates will hang on and continue their efforts. A similar situation will likely persist in the Idlib area. Standing up USZs from the east will begin to present a third alternative to what is occurring elsewhere. Consider the establishment of USZs that apply to, and protect ALL Syrians as a requisite to bringing the Syrian Conflict to a sustainable close in a step-by-step geographical, granular manner. Universal protection would also be consonant with the mainstream Hanafi branch of Islamic law. This distinction is also integral to the rebuilding of Syria. There is a need to push back against the Islamists’ message of a caliphate that incorporates Iraq, Syria and the Levant.

C4ISR and Establishing the Universal Safe Zone

Diplomatic envoys and military attaché who engage to actualize the suggested solution sets can readily utilize what the past three years has visited upon a fissured Syria and the surrounding region. Unlike the conventional carrots and sticks that typically are externally applied, most in this instance are either self-inflicted or have been allowed to develop. Rather, the task before diplomats and military attaché will initially be pointing out to the participants the rewards and dangers that already exist. Their mission’s first task can be distilled into one word: Clarity. Virtually all the players have supplanted strategic vision and the long view with a parochial tactical myopia that has had all reacting to the shifting ground truth, as they see it. Most remain trapped in this reaction mode. Without an outside perspective, none will find a way to seeing the greater whole, either the chessboard itself or the dimension of time. And as the SNC’s Ahmed Jarba has put it, “Time is blood,”

To wait for a ‘solution’ predicated on the entire geography of Syria is both foolish and morally indefensible by any standard of diplomatic efficacy. The means to accomplish this are manifold, and MUST be approached in an integrated manner. Universal Safe Zones are necessary and provide a means of restoring public safety and civil order to war-torn Syria before it serves to effectively unravel neighboring Lebanon. By taking a granular approach to establishing public safety and seeing the mission focus as providing the bare minimum of a sovereign, public safety and civil order the FSA can begin to help shape a fractured Syria piece by piece in concert with civil authorities inside Syria, and not with absent members of a coalition that have little relevance inside Syria. Again, the overriding intent is to promote civilian authority primacy over military. Yes, the focus is how to put Syria back together again even as the Levant fissures. While Lebanon is no longer a part of Greater Syria, the dynamics next door remain critical. So while the focus is post-conflict Syria, it is actually the Levant from a broader perspective.

One of the key tasks for diplomats will be to convince The United States, United Kingdom, France, and Turkey that their tangible support for Universal Safe Zones is critical. With their assent, it should be made clear that if a defensible area or region seeks an interim International Human Rights Law regime coupled with universal protection of all within such an area or region, e.g., a USZ, that supporting aid and matériel will be quickly forthcoming based on the MoU and the supporting Service Level Agreement contracts. This agreed upon effort to stand up a Universal Safe Zone would then be related to the controlled disbursement of weapons advisors or ‘civilian’ contractors who could also provide chain of custody for sensitive weapons. A letter of offer and acceptance, e.g., a LOA perhaps should be the first step in addressing the issue of weapons and matériel transfers. A pressing will be the provision of intelligence product and communications gear to interface in a net-centric manner.

Granular sovereignty should not be such an unusual concept. It has been applied over and over again under different guises and appellations. What this writer proposes is to make this actuality aboveboard and in this fashion overtly address sovereignty as tied to the minimal ability to provide for public safety. In this instance, the government in question is attacking its citizens under the color of authority and is engaged in a massive campaign of deceit and personal threats to compel internal compliance to the regime. Equally important is the fact that USZs allow for indigenous leadership to develop and evolve within the USZ. At a later date, if events indicate, USZs could abjure both Damascus’ claim to national sovereignty and jurisdiction over USZs, based on an interpretation of a FAILED STATE’S Sovereignty while still holding to Uti possidetis juris, a principle of international law that succeeding new states should have the same borders.

C4ISR

The Integration of C4ISR into the Operational Ethos of Standing up the Al Hasakah Universal Safe Zone is an Imperative. This is not just for the Protective Force but also to mesh Civil Authority, Civil Policing and the Protective Force into one interlocking presence. Attacks by Islamist units will not be eliminated, but their potential to harm will be greatly constricted. The integrating and expansion of the above to maximize information management and situational awareness for the Universal Safe Zone requires what military practitioners refer to as C4ISR to integrate all participants in the Universal Safe Zone. It is the qualitative edge needed to enable success. There will be no second chances.

Communications equipment to link to provisional civilian authorities and military commanders is part and parcel of this outreach to stabilize the USZ and its environs. BGAN units and military standard radio transceivers must be woven together into an effective communications net that is both flexible and resilient. Consider this a civil application of C4ISR. At the sub-MoU service Level Agreement contracts providing effective commo network and then real-time intelligence product and organic assets for USZ Protective Force defenders to conduct their own ISR with mini UAVs would make a tremendous qualitative difference.

What is important for some outside (national) intelligence providers, because of the technology employed, it is imperative that serious violations of the USZ Memorandum of Understanding and the supporting SLA will result in an immediate cutoff of intelligence and commo capabilities by remotely disabling the offending military unit’s BGAN uplinks. This should allay the concerns of providers contributing area intelligence products to the certified USZ administration and their signatory security units. In addition, and perhaps more importantly in the long run, this upgrade in communications capability is an integral part of quickly establishing effective civilian command and control.

It should be pointed out to Turkey that fulfilling the above requirements is an opportunity for defense company Askeri Elektronik Sanayi, e.g., ASELSAN A.Ş. to both act as supplier and integrator and demonstrate to potential customers its competence in the C4ISR field.

The act of imbedding area intelligence into the real-time security watch and civil administration of a USZ will achieve synergisms beyond basic civil command and control. The same Net-Centric architecture will be what participating signatory NGOs and eventually, UNHCR Agencies will hook into when operating in the USZ, enabling both civilian leadership and the security force an expanded, superior real-time situational awareness with secure cloud-based servers accessed with BGAN uplinks or if outside of Syria, via available commercial Internet providers. In a conflict with a more powerful force, having superior situational awareness is a major determinant of outcome. Superior C4ISR applied to a Net-Centric Asymmetrical Defensive warfighting philosophy can do much with advanced real-time situational awareness and is critical for effective Peace Keeping Operations, and other Military Operations other Than War.

In the case of overall communications in the USZ and the outside world, including the Global Telecommunications Cluster, the Supporting Service Level Sub-Agreement Contracts should specify communications protocol as being compatible with Emergency Preparedness Integration Centre (EPIC) links and services with an eye on eventual integration with Syrian Telcom when ground conditions change, with or without Makhlouf equity involved. Realistically the Protective Force designated in the USZ MoU, with rigorous active advisor oversight, should have responsibility for maintaining the C4ISR physical net and the cloud interface to ensure 24/7 connectivity AND interoperability with all participants managing and supporting the Universal Safe Zone. This includes security for the USZ’s communications net as well as a pre-emptive counterintelligence function to prevent the expected attempts to penetrate and compromise by hostile forces, including Iranian advisors and the regime’s extended intelligence apparatus. One cannot overemphasize the need to be proactive regarding the Assad regime’s competence, albeit with Iranian assistance, in basic and counterintelligence operations.

The Military Mission in Support of a Universal Safe Zone

As the Protective Force will be integral to the communications management of the Universal Safe Zone’s day-to-day administration, perhaps it is wise to include the expected role the Protective Force will assume in fulfilling the USZ’s management. Precepts of military in support of these initiatives and functions need not be rehashed.
I purloin shamelessly from, The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, from the United States Army War College is succinct. While the military function is in a support role, it is essential. An excerpt of the Executive Summary from its Protection of Civilians Military Reference Guide follows:

Spectrum of Military Operations

Whether engaged in PSO or MOAC, military forces support PoC in two general ways:

Do No Harm. Military forces act in accordance with International Humanitarian
Law—also known as the Law of Armed Conflict (IHL/LOAC) and other relevant bodies of law in order to minimize civilian harm. Additionally, military forces avoid actions that undermine efforts by other actors that improve human security.

Deliberate PoC Actions Military forces conduct offensive, defensive, and stability operations expressly intended to mitigate harm to civilians, including operations intended to create an environment conducive to PoC.

PoC is a broadly used term with different interpretations and is discussed throughout the PoC Military Reference Guide in the general contexts of MOAC and PSO. In this Guide, PoC is broadly defined as “efforts to protect civilians from physical violence, secure their rights to access essential services and resources, and contribute to a secure, stable, and just environment for civilians over the long-term.” It notes that PoC has military and non-military aspects and may be viewed as a layered set of issues, including physical protection from imminent violence, the provision of basic necessities, protection of human rights, and broader enabling conditions. Experience has shown, and this guide assumes, that military forces merely play a partial role in guaranteeing PoC. In many cases, they will support police and civilian organizations that must ultimately ensure that PoC is effective and lasting.

The PoC Military Reference Guides’ philosophy is that: PoC is a moral, political, legal, and strategic priority for all military operations. Communities on the ground and around the world expect uniformed personnel to protect the population; failure to do so jeopardizes the credibility and legitimacy of the operation and can undermine other objectives.

5 PoC Principles The Guide discusses five overarching principles to guide military forces in the protection of civilians during their operations:

• Principle #1: Continually Understand the Situation. Military forces must have an understanding of the relevant situational variables, including the military and non-military factors in the operational environment, the significant actors, and dynamics shown in the following figure. In order to maintain a current appreciation of the situational variables, military forces must collect and manage information from a variety of sources, share relevant information, and conduct accurate assessments of PoC risks including vulnerabilities and threats.

• Principle #2: Pursue the Desired Outcomes. Military forces and other actors will strive to achieve five desired outcomes that ultimately are necessary for long term protection of civilians from imminent violence:

1. Safe and Secure Environment
2. Good Governance
3. Rule of Law
4. Social Well-Being
5. Sustainable Economy

Non-military actors have primary responsibility and capability for many of the efforts necessary to achieve the desired outcomes. Together with police, the military is most suited for establishing a Safe and Secure Environment in which civilians are protected from imminent threats of violence. However, the other four outcomes are also significant because they directly affect civilian well-being. Additionally, inadequate attention to the other outcomes, or poor synchronization of the efforts, can result in grievances that generate conflict which threatens civilians. Non-military host state and international actors will largely address these other four outcomes. The military will usually act in support of these other actors, primarily enabling their efforts by maintaining a Safe and Secure Environment. Realistic expectations must be managed at all times, and progress towards all of the desired outcomes will often require transition of responsibility among different actors. Various responsibilities and authorities may be transferred among the military force, host state institutions, or international organizations. The military force and other actors must ensure that PoC is maintained during transitions as risks to civilians can increase significantly.

• Principle #3: Design and Conduct Operations that Quickly Reduce PoC Risks. In some situations, military forces plan, prepare, and conduct operations specifically to protect civilians. In others, they support the protection of civilians with offensive, defensive, and stability operations that are primarily conducted for other purposes. The military force may employ a combination of seven different PoC operational approaches, including Area Security, Clear-Hold-Build, Separation, Safe Areas, Partner Enabling, Containment, and Defeat Adversaries. Normal military functions such as command and control, patrolling, logistics, and force protection can all have a significant impact upon the protection of civilians. It is important for military forces to “mainstream” PoC considerations into their planning and operations and to anticipate unintended consequences.

• Principle #4: Comprehensively Engage the Full Range of Actors. PoC is a multidimensional endeavor that requires contributions from a variety of actors including police forces, NGOs, international organizations, host state organizations, the media, and businesses. Many have no formal relationship with the military force or its political superiors, but are nonetheless instrumental in achieving the desired outcomes that enhance PoC. Military leaders must engage these contributors— as well as local leaders and the population—and coordinate with them as effectively as possible. Units also conduct joint operations with international and host state military, police, and civilian organizations. Military forces may support and build the capacity of other partners as appropriate and will often form Civil- Military Cooperation Centers to facilitate multidimensional cooperation. In order to mitigate human security risks, units may enable humanitarian assistance largely by providing “space” for other contributors that are more suitable for addressing many PoC issues.

• Principle #5: Shape the Protective Environment. PoC requires more than the effective performance of military tasks; it also depends upon the creation of a surrounding environment conducive to PoC. Key measures to support this include the continuous mitigation of PoC and other mission risks and effective Public Information Activities (PIA). Security Sector Reform (SSR), Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR), and Transitional Justice (TJ) programs can help transform the environment so that lasting PoC can be achieved. Military support to the prevention of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV), the protection of children, and community building are particularly important ways to shape a protective environment.

As a precursor to any discussion of the military function as it relates to standing up the First Universal Safe Zones it must be made clear that the mission is not centered on the fighting that is about toppling the regime or fighting for territory with that objective in mind. The mission profile is assisting in standing up Universal Safe Zones in an incremental fashion with the objective being the restoration of public safety for Syrians and other noncombatants, including employees of NGOs and UN agencies.

What is hoped for, if not easily achieved, is that the Protective Forces for a Universal Safe Zone become a second track for fighters as their primary military mission. The distinction may be difficult for some, but it must be made.

The intent of this paper’s initiatives is not to engage or attempt to dissuade rebels from their agendas. Again, it is to focus on bringing Universal Safety to ALL inhabitants of a negotiated, declared USZ. While this may appear to be a cosmetic differentiation to observers, it is not. Thus far it and any group or within Syria, any military unit’s effort has failed to bridge the gap that yawns between their efforts and the constituencies the Assad regime has commanded liege from. Understand that for may Syrians terrified by the actions of combatants seeking to wield kinetics as a political solution, safety and a cessation of fighting is all they can muster hope for. At this juncture, not a few combatants share this desire, whether they come from a town in the Alawite an Nusayriyah Mountains or in Dera’a.

This initiative is not anti-rebel, save where rebel forces seek to engage in Universal Safe Zones. Nor is it designed to enable Bashar Assad’s regime in maintaining condign control over the west. The military mission is to support USZs and all that this entails and implies. This mission is to effect on the ground Freedom from Fear, Freedom from criminal acts, and an express Freedom of Expression for ALL who reside within a Universal Safe Zone. A focus by all outside participants on hastening remunerative economic activity is also a mission focus that the protective force can enable indirectly and also directly via expenditures that compensate Syrian civilian contractors operating within the USZ.

The dynamics of such tasking is without a doubt, going to be fluid and likely to span the full range of military operations in terms of time and geography as the periphery of an USZ is tested by hostile forces along with the constant need to secure Lines of Communications for the sustaining of that USZ along with the timely delivery of matériel for the USZ’s protective force. It should be anticipated that the range of kinetics will likely vary within the same time period. While the protective force itself will not engage in major operations, other units not under the control of the UNSZ civil authority are likely to impinge upon the delineated territory defined by the USZ MoU for a particular Universal Safe Zone.

The direction the protective force, with organizational and planning support from the military advisors assigned to the USZ, should be inexorably towards reducing the presence and footprint of the force as it turns over security responsibility to civilian police and the USZ civil authority. This will also include the management of the intelligence function with one notable caveat, the need for the counterintelligence mission will not vanish, and must continue with stringent oversight by outside advisory staff until real stability becomes established.

Priorities:

• Securing of Lines of Communication to facilitate the restoration of commerce along with the LOCs required for NGOs, and later, UN agencies to operate safely and with increasing efficiency

• Air Defense, as mentioned earlier, will require the coordinated maintenance of ground security perimeters to protect air defense missile batteries manned by other party military or private military contractors.

• Logistics management of supplies, including matériel and weapons for both control and prevention of theft and diversion to black markets. Civil-Military management may be one approach, but verifiable oversight and transparency is a must from the very beginning of disbursal. This includes the paymaster function. Understand that the protective force may be the incremental beginnings of a new Syrian Military in the post-conflict period. Anti-corruption must be an imperative.

• Training in and application of Asymmetrical Warfighting With Superior C4ISR Support to anticipate attacks upon the Al Hasakah USZ.

• As needed, Expediting Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief in Al Hasakah USZ. Securing and or training fighters to protect LOCs and integrating C4ISR assets and operational concepts for such is a critical mission.

• One of the MOST important tasks, as belittled a it is likely to be, is developing the uniform Soldier Skills Training Modules and Doctrine Modules related to Ethics, Human Rights Laws and Laws of War. When imbedded into a Universal Lawfare Safe Zone Agreement in terms of expectations of a Protecting Military Unit for the USZ as conditions of certification, and ongoing monitoring of the safe zone. In exchange, the entire USZ benefits both directly in terms of security and also indirectly from economic spin-offs and income multiplier if provisioning funds are spent through the USZ’s pocket economy or other participating USZs.

• Training and Doctrine for commonality, C&C, eligibility for compensation, respect for civil authority, counterintelligence to identify hostile agents and reduction of blued on blue incidents, moral turpitude, warfighting and USZ area security in a C4ISR operating environment

• Training and certifying trainers to facilitate the indoctrination of future protective force personnel for new Universal Safe Zones.

• Responsibility for maintaining and deploying C4ISR intelligence-gathering assets, including aerial platforms.

• Establishing and maintaining an effective Tactical Operations Center to both support and interface with the Civil Authority’s civilian police force, and other operations, including the various Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief organizations and control points that include roadways, whether they be run by civilian or military personnel. The seamless functioning of this C4ISR backbone and cloud interface 24/7 must remain a priority, along with the security necessary. Counterintelligence is an imbedded function/mission that will require intimate oversight by outside advisors.

• The responsibility for managing and maintaining employed C4ISR assets and feeds, including fused intelligence products streamed from enabling sources external to the USZ is critical. An outside advisor must be in the loop attending to this vital function both in the instructor advisor function as well as oversight in the civil rights mission.

• Ultimately, the human infrastructure of a netcentric communications network at any level of sophistication is about mindset and the soldier’s perception horizon. When tools and the attendant KSAs, Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities are transferred to the users and they GET that this is about both prevailing AND surviving, the lessons will ber applied.

• This knowledge that is imbedded in the training modules and operational doctrines transferred, the overall ethos of what a soldier in a New Syrian Military Establishment is what this is all about. It ALWAYS starts at the bottom, unless one is casual about a distance in the ranks in terms of military and humanitarian values.

• The integrating of equipment into a secure military grade communications network for C4ISR needs is the first step in providing the communications backbone that will be necessary for the FSA to strengthen command and control while standing up an intelligence function that will afford the Protective Force commanders real-time intelligence assets and products distributed over a secure net.

• The communications network is the basis to begin producing real-time superior situational awareness while reinforcing command and control and accountability. With a secure, integrated military grade encrypted communications net, the USZ’s Protective Force would be positioned to begin the process of developing a superior situational awareness over other opposing combatants in the area of operations. This ability would enable better communication and coordination with NGOs as well as outside government foreign ministries. The Protective Force and USZ civil authorities must not remain dependent on Syrian Telecom for communications.

• Next, the aerial ISR elements need to be integrated. These would largely be mini-UAVs. For the purposes of illustration, a specific system will be depicted, the RQ-11B Raven UAS manufactured by AeroVironment of Monrovia, California. While the problem for export remains, the RQ-11B is now used by a multitude of militaries and civilian agencies around the world. The United States Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, and the Special Operations Command use the RQ-11B. In addition, foreign customers include Australia, Estonia, Italy, Denmark, Spain and Czech Republic. As of early 2012, over 19,000 airframes have been shipped, making it the most widely adopted UAV system in the world today.

• With this level of distribution, security concerns on the part of the United States would be disingenuous. Recently, in Agadir, Morocco U.S. Marines, along with German and Moroccan counterparts, conducted a small unmanned flying vehicle familiarization course for Exercise African Lion 13 that shared the capabilities of the RQ-11B Raven as part of the Intelligence Capacity Building Workshop. Integrating this platform addresses the need for real-time ISR and the ability to share via sufficient numbers of systems with the Protective Force would begin to a BGAN satellite uplink with other commanders and perhaps foreign intelligence agencies as well.

• Protective Force commanders would have access to real-time intelligence via the secure network. The operator sees what the UAV sees and controls the RQ-11 with a video tablet ground control station. The video feed can be transmitted via the Hughes BGAN uplink to distribute the real-time aerial ISR video imaging.

• Current operators of the RQ-11 system: Australia, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Iraq, Italy, Kenya, Lebanon, Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, United Kingdom, United States, Pakistan, Uganda, and Yemen. The above italicized countries may be potential donors if the US’ State Department is willing to waive restrictions on the transfer of these UAV systems and training.

• If the Rq-11 is unavailable, alternates can be sourced from Singapore, Israel, and Turkey for the mini- UAV requirement. As noted above, the United States has already given this small surveillance UAV system to two African nations to track, deter and combat insurgents.

• A substantial improvement would be a private military contractor guiding the process with the Protective Force units responsible for the USZ’s security.

The Situation, Late June 2014

We are faced with the prospect of a Second Alawite State, an Assad-Makhlouf fiefdom along the Mediterranean that is preparing to explore and lift gas and gas condensates from offshore fields. This Alawite State will seek absolute control of access to the sea and this objective will in itself become a festering causus belli. Destruction of urban areas in the north-south corridor delineated by the M-5 Motorway and the Orontes River Valley will continue intermittently from Aleppo in the north down to Damascus as the tactical situation evolves. If the North-South Corridor running from Aleppo to Homs evolves into a back and forth stalemate, Assad may settle for a political ‘solution’ to give his military a respite. Coaxed by Russia, outside powers might enable such a fragile state of affairs with another Taif Agreement , This would spell disaster for Syrians, and possibly also for a Lebanon increasingly dominated by Hezbollah which will receive weapons and matériel from Iran via the ports at Tartus, Baniyas and Latakia as well as the joint Syrian/Iranian airbase-airbridge at Bassel Al-Assad International Airport. Make no mistake; absent a material change in the trajectory of this conflict’s dynamics, a dysfunctional diplomatic papering over is the most likely outcome, and the most likely mid-term future for the East Mediterranean Littoral.

Supported by Iran and Russia, the Alawite rump state will be will be surrounded by an unstable landscape of warlords and Jihadist-Islamist strongholds that will periodically erupt into internecine warfare with it as well as with each other and the Kurds and ISIS as a singular entity.

Now a self declared caliphate, ISIS’ area of operations will, if unchecked, extend from al Raqqa in the north central region southeast to Deir ez-Zor, continuing down the M-4 and Euphrates past al-Basira through Abu Kamal and into Iraq’s Anbar Province, as far as Ramadi or Fallujah. Nineveh and Anbar Provinces will merge into southern Al Hasakah Governorate and all of Deir ez-Zor Governorate.

If it survives, the Al Hasakah portion of Kurdish Rojava will cling to KRG, whether it remains with Iraq or not. This will become a strategic imperative. If ISIS succeeds in slicing up from the Khabur River, Rojava will be riven and it days numbered.

The reality of today’s Syria is that for most civilians, and not a few combatants, safety for themselves and their families is the most pressing concern. After this fundamental human need to avoid being killed is their ability to continue to survive, meaning food, housing, and medical attention. In impacted areas not under Assad’s control, jobs, education for their children and young adults, and a means to begin the long process of picking up the pieces of their shattered lives is elusive, if not a chimera. Finally, any hope of pushing past the paroxysm of trauma, grief, and hate spawned by this horrific war is even further into an indefinable future. The list of needs is longer than what is described above, and time is short to directly address, lest any prescription to end this conflict and heal the nation becomes insurmountable. If you doubt, look west to Lebanon as a very mild example of what lies in wait.

Some quick observations of the Syrian Theatre of War follow:

• The Syrian Arab Army and its subordinate forces, including Hezbollah, currently have a regional strategic initiative over the disparate rebel forces. In the past three years its core cadre has become a more experienced, smaller but nonetheless, mobile force. These forces still enjoy the ability to transport by air both men and matériel using Mi-8 and Mi-17 helicopters. This air dominance also affords the ability to apply force by air unopposed. Civilians have suffered tremendously. Another critical advantage of regime forces is the intact communications net of these forces and the ability to fight both as militia and combined arms forces. Along with superior command and control, regime forces also have consistently demonstrated superiority in situational awareness. The Syrian intelligence apparatus has been augmented with specialists from Iran, most effectively with SIGINT and ELINT specialists., including the standing up of electronic listening posts.

• Three years of conflict have exacerbated fissures revealing human tectonics: Alawite Coastal-an Nusayriyah Mountains, Druze in As Suwayda and environs, a checkerboard North from Idlib Governorate to ISIS dominated Al Raqqah abutting an Al Hasakah dominated by Kurdish Rojava in the Northeast. Arab tribes in rural southern Al Hasakah into Deir ez-Zor Governorate and urban dwellers in Deir ez-Zor city live in an area that is rapidly merging as one contested area of operations down along the Euphrates to Ramada and Falluja in Iraq’s Anbar Province. A resurgent ISIS is on the verge of cleaving Syria in two, from the Turkish border down thru Al Raqqa, the ‘caliphate’s new capital, along the Euphrates-M4 Motorway Line Of Communication down past Abu Kamal and into Anbar Province. ISIS is currently battling fighters from those Arab tribes, depleted FSA units, and anti-ISIS Islamist forces to secure this LOC and the rest of Deir ez-Zor Governorate into Nineveh and Anbar Provinces in Iraq to secure the core of its self-declared caliphate.

• There is and will continue to be inevitable conflict between weakened moderate rebels despite alliances of convenience against the regime and ISIS. Tension with Jabhat al Nusra in Deraa is illustrative. Foreign fighters from Iraq (Shia) and from Lebanon (Shia) are frequently engaged in combat with foreign Sunni fighters as the dynamics are also sectarian.

• If and when fighting spreads to the west of Krak des Chevaliers along the Homs-Akkar Gap leading to the Mediterranean Coast, North Lebanon will become an active part of this area of operations. ISIS operatives are already busy with bombings to further destabilize Lebanon as well as draw off Hezbollah fighters from Syria operations to protect their interests in Lebanon. Likewise, thousands of Iraqi Shia fighters, including from Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, have recently returned to Iraq in response to ISIS’ current offensive in Iraq.

• As the regime gains and consolidates territory in the west’s urban areas, rebels, especially jihadists/Islamists, will see the Northwest tucked between Latakia and Hatay Province, Turkey as an area for serious thrusts deep into the Alawite heartland. Jisr ash Shugur will once again become a hotly contested prize. If prolonged, both Turkmen and Alevi from north of the border may become inexorably drawn into this area of operations.

• If Bashar al-Assad is abruptly removed from the ongoing dynamics, this will possibly only serve to accelerate sectarian internecine civil war. The diplomatic efforts by the ‘Friends of Syria’ have become an unproductive stranglehold on any progress towards a sustainable peace. The dynamics of both external discussion and internal warfighting must change, and quickly.

• The Obama Administration’s recent pronouncements on arms supply are cause for both optimism and dread. The types and amounts ($500 million) of training, weapons, and matériel to be supplied at an uncertain date will in all likelihood serve to increase battle kinetics without changing either the strategic outlook or tactical advantage. This increase in casualties will only serve to deepen the conflict. Further, the Obama Administration still lacks a vision or strategy aside from adding ineffective weight to the ideation that peace still can be achieved with diplomacy from outside of Syria. Integrated focus and strategy is critical to determinative outcomes. This is absent. By not working with moderate and or willing rebels in a coordinated manner that includes advisors to enable tactical resources to be applied more effectively, any increased flow of arms and matériel by outside nations and private entities will only result in prolonging the conflict. More killing is not a strategic goal, but absent clarity of thought, this will continue with increasingly intractable opponent –to-opponent dynamics.

• In the north - south corridor formed by the Orontes River and the road network centered on the M-5 to the east of the Orontes, the regime forces will dominate, but as opportunity presents itself, this corridor will become a checkerboard of ethnic cleansing and wholesale slaughter of civilians. These lands east of the an-Nusayriyah Mountains will be contested by an array of militia ranging from the diminished moderate forces to ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic Front.

• Preparations for a second Alawite State began in 2011 and remains as a ‘Plan B’ for the Assad regime. If activated, what is likely is that Latakia and Tartus will become a rump state form Turkey’s Hatay Province in the north to Northern Lebanon in the south. Along with assistance from Russia and Iran, a second Alawite State will rely on a Hezbollah dominated Lebanese government to strengthen political and economic ties. Ethnic cleansing in preparation for an Alawite State has continued off and on since mid-2011 and recent mass killings on all sides designed to drive people into fleeing have occurred in the two governorates. That said, the regime’s goal is to hold on to the economic north-south corridor as well as the water supplies that the Alawite Coast is short of.

• The above points to a longer, deeper conflict that leads to the rendering of Syria into at least three pieces, a resurrected Alawite State, Rojava cantons in the north and northeast, and a vast area stretching from Deir ez-Zor to al Raqqa dominated by ISIS and allied Islamist-Caliphate forces.

• Of note is that the Druze National Defense Force units from As Suwayda in the Southeast have refused to take part in the regime’s operations in the Southwest. In this respect, fearful Druze increasingly mirrors a position analogous to the Kurds in the Northeast. A deeper overview can be found here.

• There is potential in directly approaching the Druze communities, especially those east of Dera’a in as-Suwaydā’, to encourage them to declare their areas Universal Safe Zones under their own authority and with direct outside assistance. This could occur if the Northeast is first successful in standing up a Universal Safe Zone and the Druze are given believable assurances of support. Serious attacks from Islamists would be a precipitating event. What is notable that the regime funded Druze National Defense Force has been reluctant to join other regime-affiliated forces engaged in combat with the various rebel forces in southwest Syria. Additionally, Druze clerics gathered in April to protest against the regime’s intelligence in Suwaydā’ City . Fearing loss of Druze support, the regime quickly removed local intelligence chief Wafiq Nasser. Also, in May Druze sheikhs from Idlib in the north met with Jamal Maarouf (moderate Syrian Revolutionary Front) who told them, “No matter what his [ethnic or sectarian] affiliation is, any Syrian citizen … and the Syrian people – they’re all my brethren,” he said. “This is the first time we’ve heard such talk,” one of the sheikhs responded. “We’ve seen extremism, as you know,” the sheikh continued. “When someone speaks moderately, and is concerned with the nation, then anyone who is sane will support him.”

• It is unlikely that on their own moderate rebel forces could sway the Druze community along with their local NDF fighters to join them, but if the moderate rebels instead support the safety and economic well-being of the Druze without seeking control, a third path towards establishing Universal Safe Zone has real potential. It is possible that the local Druze dominated NDF could form the core of a protective force for a Universal Safe Zone in the as-Suwaydā’ region. Continued compensation may become an issue. Denying the Assad regime Druze support would in of itself be strategic given as-Suwaydā’s geographic location, and give pause to other minorities who continue to support the regime, either willingly or under duress and fear of extermination by the rebels.

• A successful standing up of a Druze USZ would be tangible proof of a third path that leads directly to normalcy in a world gone to hell. This is an important dynamic. Many Alawite, Druze, and Greek Orthodox towns and villages in the An Nusayriyah Mountains are increasingly fearful. Alawites especially, who dislike the Assad and Makhlouf clans are fearful of Sunni Syrians who already talk of and have acted out revenge. This abhorrent ethnic cleansing and killing, while episodic, continues while soldiers and state security from these towns and villages are taking the brunt of casualties, with funerals occurring every day. The regime supported and funded para-military National Defense Force has also experienced notable casualties within its ranks.

• The SNC and moderate rebels have no solution to Latakia and Tartus Governorates, nor how they would ‘pacify’ non-Sunni towns and villages that shadow the Orontes River and the vital north-south M-5 Motorway. Indeed, some jihadist/Islamist rebel factions seek to exacerbate this fissuring human terrain as part and parcel of creating a neo-caliphate in the Levant. Recent statements to the contrary do not give minorities confidence in their intent. Indeed, rebels currently have no cohesive, cogent plans for administering areas under their nominal control. It is at best, ad hoc and without civil authority at the apex of governance.

• One example amongst many failures is the inability of rebels to target the regime’s fuel supplies and its ability to re-supply this critical resource. Secure deliveries to the coastal oil terminals of Tartus and Baniyas is part of the problem, but the fighting occurs away from the coast. This unmet mission requires more than kinetic resources. Coordination, Intelligence gathering, processing, and intelligence product distribution are all C4ISR functions the outside powers ignore. In addition to poor command and control, the rebels lack access to cogent C4ISR , much less airborne intelligence resources that would afford advance warning and the ability to track ground movements and hostile aircraft, both inbound and on egress.

• The Syrian Arab Air Force has a limited number of aircraft and an order of battle should be updated constantly. The rebel forces have never done this task, although outside powers’ intelligence agencies probably are tasked to do so. At some point in the future, this may prove necessary.

• At this juncture, the United States, United Kingdom, France, European Union, Russia, Iran, Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia are unlikely to shift from their current positions and action/inaction regarding political positions and tangible support. In short, the war will continue to deepen enmity and casualties will continue to mount as Syria’s public and private infrastructure is pounded into dust.

• The June 2014 “elections” to re-install Bashar Assad reflects his personal belief that he will eventually prevail, and there is little to persuade him otherwise. But Syria is destined to be a collection of warlord territories and the ideations of the Obama, Cameron, and Hollande governments can no longer be taken seriously as the killing and destruction continues unabated.

• In terms of warfighting a new strategy is called for. The key is to change the Center of Gravity from defeating Assad militarily and prosecuting conflict to strategies looking to establish safe zones, beginning in the east, and having local authorities take responsibility for public safety as the first step. The early desire in 2012 for the FSA to operate under civil authority remains valid. The true Center of Gravity in this conflict is and has always been the civilian population. The strategic focus must be on providing public safety for that citizenry, regardless of political affiliation, ethnicity, or religion. This is the one thing neither the Damascus regime or Islamists bent on a neo-caliphate are either willing or capable of delivering to all the Syrian people.

• Al Hasakah Governorate: Kurdish Rojava’s cantons, along with the rest of Al Hasakah Governorate itself could be encouraged to declare itself a Universal Safe Zone, qualifying for direct humanitarian and military assistance. This region should be looked to as the first Universal Safe Zone to be established. Unlike other areas in Syria that the author has researched, the main impediments to standing up a USZ here are political; Turkey and the KRG, Iraq governments have hindered Syrian Kurds and attempted to place an economic stranglehold upon Al Hasakah.

• While a cursory examination would attribute this to the dominant PYD’s ties to the PKK, the actual reasons are more complex. The Barzani dominated KRG is at odds with the PYD for more parochial reasons. Internally, the PYD has been less than enthusiastic about sharing power in what will likely be a Kurdish federated state in a post-war Syria. The political imbroglio is solvable with pressure from nations outside of the Near East. In addition, the recent election results next door in Iraqi Kurdistan indicates a possible tempering on KDP’s (38.34 %) fiat with the continued growth in popularity of Gorran (23.03 %) which broke away from KDP rival PUK (24.8 %) . Mohammed Kayani, a member of the Iraqi parliament for Gorran recently said, “We clearly support this (Rojava) administration, which fills the administrative, political, military and security vacuum in the area.” Echoing this, PUK Kirkuk Gov. Najmaldin Karim added, "The success of the temporary government of Rojava is the success of all Kurds," The economic potential for the NE Syria region, along with the potential for HA/DR lines of communication into Syria from the east are potentially the most secure entrepôt to Syria and the logistic potential when looking at the roadways and rail lines are not to be underestimated. The key to a USZ in Al Hasakah is diplomatic pressure on Turkey, the Barzani-KDP led KRG government and the ostensibly PKK affiliated PYD led by Salih Muslim along with its military wing, the YPG.

• On 9 May 2014 parties other than the PYD gathered in Qamishli and declared an initiative for the democratization of Syria . While they lack the political and military clout of the PYD, it is vulnerable on many fronts, and Kurdish Democratic Union Party head Saleh Muslim is perhaps more flexible than his rival Masoud Barzani of Iraq’s KDP, which in many ways is a hereditary political institution. The potential for this area to be the first Universal Safe Zone will receive a more detailed treatment with the operational information that follows.

• Key Note: The PYD’s military affiliate, the YPG has fought alongside Shammar fighters in Al Hasakah against ISIS units. Part of the ‘message’ the YPG wants to disseminate is that they ally themselves with minority groups in this diverse governorate. While this is selective, and many Kurdish groups complain about the PYD and YPG in relation to themselves, this stance has some truth to it. Although the Turkish sponsored SNC and Syrian Kurds sharply differ on a “federated Syria”, Universal Safe Zones need not be a roadblock. There is room for vagueness as well as alliances to form that may result in a more stable political climate leading to USZs.

• The humanitarian need for Universal Safe Zones is most pressing in the west, but this region is also the most contested and problematic. For a granular, region by region establishment of stability to succeed, the first Universal Safe Zone must be either a success for other embattled regions to observe, or at least be an encouraging work in progress. Failure would in all likelihood extinguish this approach to restoring public safety and social order in Syria. This is the rationale behind beginning this initiative in the northeast.

• Diplomatic efforts, whether to end the war or provide humanitarian assistance where it is truly needed, have failed. To a large extent these efforts have failed due to piecemeal efforts that lack integration of the parts or a strategic vision and intent. Faced with an implacable regime and Islamist opponents who have both strategic intent and integrated approaches to actualize their respective goals, this alliance of good will has little to show after over three years of increasingly intractable war. Recently, the Damascus regime has declared that any humanitarian aid entering Syria via border crossings it does not control is an act of war.

• As a result, efforts to push forward humanitarian assistance into Syria itself has enabled the regime to control aid and selectively use starvation as a weapon against opponents and Syria’s civilian population. While not intending to, the acquiescence of IGOs and NGOs has enabled Damascus to control aid going into Syria. Siege warfare has returned in the 21st century with deadly vengeance. The other major party it has benefited with this bullying is ISIS, strengthening its control over the civilian populace in Al Raqqa.

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