Habiba Hamid · @habibahamid
12th Apr 2011 from Twitlonger
Context on arrest of Dr Nasser bin Ghaith in the UAE:
MANSOOR UPDATE
1. Since writing on Saturday http://www.twitlonger.com/show/9ogqrh with regard to the arrest of Ahmed Mansoor, the UAE’s internal dynamic has shifted.
2. The first arrest of @Ahmed_Mansoor was met with mixed responses by the UAE community, much of it based on speculation as to why he was arrested.
3. There were three types of criticism against Mansoor. A common accusation circulating, that Mansoor frequently directly criticised the ruling families is one that is enough, in the legal system, to merit an arrest.
4. Reuters has just reported that the arrest was related to a possession of alcohol, again an illegal act for a citizen. However, that Mansoor was both expecting the police well in advance and had called them formally after security outside his apartment showed up, leaves unanswered questions as to that charge.
5. Another type of criticism levelled against Mansoor was attributable to questions of loyalty, of Iranian origins i.e. loyal to Iran, or that he belonged to the Ikhwan. These accusations swiftly became redundant on the basis of subsequent arrests.
6. Under UAE law, the act of slandering the rulers is illegal and this is widely understood by the Emirati community in the UAE. It’s a redline that is crossed at one’s own responsibility.
7. There’s a distinction to be made between personal criticism of individuals within the ruling family, and constructive criticism of the UAE’s governance system itself.
8. That distinction is an important one, and has a bearing on the outcome of the reported arrest of Dr Nasser bin Ghaith. [See below].
9. Underscoring all criticques is a genuine sense of fear, of hurt and of anger at his alleged behaviour - whether or not it has a credible basis or not. Many are genuinely are committed to certain rulers here.
10. A groundswell of support in his favour is also apparent.
11. All this is fairly irrelevant now. Mansoor’s detention has been overshadowed by subsequent arrests.
SECOND ARREST Fahad Al Shehhi
12. The second arrest, as reported on CNN, was from the AlShehhi family; an indigenous tribe from the Ras Al Khaimah area with long roots and distinct traditions. No accusations as to origin or loyalty could thus apply.
THIRD ARREST: Dr Nasser bin Ghaith
13. CNN reported the arrest of Dr Nasser bin Ghaith on Sunday, and while the facts of the report have yet to be officially confirmed or verified, the report itself has arguably already shifted the domestic dynamic.
14. At the time of writing no official confirmation of the arrest of Dr Nasser bin Ghaith has been given.
15. It’s important to contextualise this. For several years, key intellectuals have often constructively commented on the nation’s development. Some have arguably been ahead of the curve in calling for certain measures, and it has taken a degree of time for others to be able to see it their way. The financial crisis accelerated domestic criticques of the management of the country, with large numbers of Emiratis in Dubai openly criticising the ‘triumverate’ in particular: Sultan Bin Sulayem, Mohammad Gergawi, and Al Abbar. Previously, these figures were virtually immune from public censure.
16. The reported step of having arrested a credible domestic dissident for political reasons, in recent years at any rate, seems unprecedented. No matter how strenuous dissident calls have been, the state response has been to issue warnings or undertake other ‘remedial’ acts; such as demotion, or political marginalisation, etc.
17. Whilst thus far it has been impossible to verify whether or not Dr Nasser bin Ghaith has infact been arrested, the perception that he may have been (as he is an exceptional figure) appears to, whether intentionally or not, criminalise dissent.
18. It is difficult to understate Dr bin Ghaith’s standing in the UAE.
It is still unclear as to where Dr Nasser Bin Ghaith may be being held, if news of his alleged arrest is verified, or why. Regardless of this, as an advisor to the army and the highest echelons of government, he certainly knew what was, and what was not, legal.
19. As a public intellectual and credible individual, his character cannot readily be impugned in the eyes of the public.
20. In 2009, Dr bin Ghaith gave one of the most highly respected, frank assessments of the Dubai crisis in a closed door, off the record talk at the Dubai School of Government, clearly explaining how key decisions were taken, who ought to be held responsible, where faults lay in the system and what should be done to move the nation, and not just Dubai forward. Rulers were exempt in the discussion.
21. It was just the sort of talk many external critics either assumed or posited wasn’t happening in Dubai, but widespread appreciation for his frankness (taken to be positive and necessary in order to rectify poor decisions) within central government was certainly there.
22. His efforts have included robust, intellectually honest defences - not just criticques - of Dubai; including participating in the Doha Debates in 2010.
23. Critically, his support is not limited to a certain cultural subset or tribe such as the Iranian Emirati community. He has had the backing of, and continues to maintain close friendships with, key stakeholders with tribal support that now play a critical, old-guard role in Dubai in the aftermath of the crisis.
24. [When pundits have attacked Dubai as a whole, I feel that they have also diminished the overarching liberalist impetus that underscored Dubai’s model during its apex. The crisis has had a profound impact upon not just Dubai, but Dubai’s function as a check upon conservative impulses within both the region and the nation. It’s impossible to put a price on any source of liberalism emanating from the region].
25. Domestic Emirati appraisals of the nation were widely omitted in the outpouring of external criticques that the nation came under. Most were largely one-sided and failed to recognise laudable state responses to the crisis – such as arrests for financial corruption - particularly in comparison with other deficit-ridden states.
26. The overall outcome of global criticism (excluding the state’s share of the burden) that failed to account for critical statist perspectives or voices such as Dr Nasser bin Ghaith, is a diminished Dubai - that progressive individuals now do not have the sort of cover for their ideas that they perhaps once did.
27. Marginalisation has, arguably, already shaped the careers of others.
28. Reformists were rarely in direct opposition with Dubai’s government, as the governance structure was often ahead of a largely unorganised civil society. Reformers were largely coopted and given high ranking posts, a great deal of trust - often with not enough oversight- and encouraged to get on with it.
29. Power - including sources of soft power - has become ever more centralised in the wake of the crisis.
30. That such a highly regarded proponent of the nation’s development, Dr Nasser bin Ghaith, may not be immune - sends a very strong signal that may have longer term implications.
31.UAE nationals, as a result of the report of the arrest, are exercising more caution than before.
32. Expatriates from Western nations can often be better placed to navigate this uncertainty - as exit strategies are available. For expatriates from nations with less political or strategic leverage, caution is advisable.
33. The UAE’s civil society has often been hindered, and characterised by individual, personal disagreements. However the move is likely to create a hitherto absent sense of solidarity. Efforts to put political aims over and above minor disputes, and coalesce around his support will probably emerge.
34. It is difficult to understate how readily he will be supported, or to anticipate wat may follow in the aftermath of his arrest.
35. Public expressions of support are not something that this generation of the UAE is accustomed to, so it is doubtful that it will be the case. But domestic dissatisfaction with the arrest will probably cause many to rethink their own positions towards the state.
In solidarity, and wAllahu 3lam
Habiba Hamid, April 2011.